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Using a unique database on individual Swedish patents, a survival model estimates how different factors 
influence the time it takes until commercialization starts. To the best of my knowledge, such an analysis 
has not been undertaken before. For external financing of patent projects and small technology-based 
firms, Sweden has during long time relied on government support rather than private venture capital 
firms. The empirical results show that the larger share of the patent-owners’ costs during the R&D-phase 
that are covered by government financial support, the longer time it takes until the patents are 
commercialized. It seems like the government financing creates a pool of patents with bad perspectives of 
commercialization. The reasons to the bad performance are: 1) the design of the government loans, where 
the patent owner can escape from paying back the loan if the project failures; and 2) the competence and 
incentives of the government institutions, which are not profit maximizing. A policy implication is 
therefore that the government should either change the conditions of the loans or, preferably, stop acting 
as a venture capital firm. The government should instead facilitate private solutions and the growth of 
private venture capital firms. 
----------------------------------- 
* The author would like to thank Lars Persson, IUI, and Erik Mellander, IFAU, for constructive 
comments, as well as Jakob Eliasson for collection of, and work with, the database.   1
1. Introduction 
It is well known that innovations are crucial for economic growth. The ultimate value of 
an innovation is the increase in economic value it creates. In order to understand the 
factors important for innovations, empirical studies have evaluated how different factors 
affect the number of granted patents. However, many patents are not commercialized 
and will not contribute to economic welfare. Thus, by using patents as measure, wrong 
conclusions might be drawn. More precisely, the purpose of this study is to analyze 
which factors are important for the choice to commercialize patents. The term 
commercialization means that the owners of the patent have taken measures with the 
purpose to generate incomes from the patent.
1 Patents rather than inventions are here 
chosen as the unit of observation, because the former are much easier to identify and 
follow. 
In the empirical analysis, a unique database of Swedish patents granted to 
medium-sized and small firms as well as individuals is used. Here, information about 
individual patents has been collected, for example, the place where the invention behind 
the patent was created, the ownership of the inventors, the financing during the R&D-
phase, whether the patent has been commercialized or not, etc. By using survival 
analysis, it is then statistically tested how different explanatory factors influence the 
time it takes until patents are commercialized. To the best of my knowledge, such a 
statistical survival analysis on the choice to commercialize patents has never been done 
earlier. 
Sweden is one of the countries in the world that spends most resources on R&D 
compared to GDP – both totally and at the universities (SOU 1996:70). At the same 
time, Sweden is top-ranked with respect to publications in international academic 
journals in relation to GDP (National Science Board, 1997), and granted patents per 
capita (EU, 2001). On the other hand, there are not so many small technology-based 
fast-growing firms in Sweden, which use the knowledge and innovations created by the 
R&D. The commercialisation of the patents and the intellectual capital seems not to be 
so efficient in Sweden (Utterback and Reitberger, 1982; Rickne and Jacobsson, 1996, 
1999; Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2001). A comparison can be made with the U.S., which 
also spend a lot of resources on R&D. However, the U.S. has had many small firms, 
                                                 
1 There are several commercialization modes, for example, commercialization in a new or existing firm, 
licensing the patent or selling the patent.   2
which – by basing their competitiveness on innovations – have grown large in sectors 
like medicine, microbiology, IT and electronics. 
During the last decade, there has been a debate in Sweden whether lack of 
venture capital and external financing for entreprenuers and inventors restarains 
economice growth and development of small technology-based firms (Braunerhjelm, 
1999; Karaömerlioglu and Jacobsson, 2000). Since investments in technology projects 
often are characterized by assymetrical information for insiders and outsiders, focus in 
the debate has also been on whether the external financiers are competent or not. In 
contrast to the U.S. where the external financing is private, firms have since long time 
been financially supported by the government in Sweden. Some government institutions 
and foundations assist also individuals and small firms with financing of patent projects 
– especially during the early part of the projects (R&D-phase) before the 
commercialization starts. The assistance takes the form of grants or favorable loans. 
These loans do not need to be repaid if the project failures, and if commercialization are 
undertaken then the repayment is connected to the turnover. In the present study, I argue 
that these conditions create moral hazard problems, because there are few incentives for 
the patent owners to continue with commercialization. Therefore, I will especially 
analyze how different financing alternatives during the R&D-phase affect the choice to 
commercialize patents. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Previous studies about commercialization of 
patents and adequate theories are discussed in section 2. In section 3, the database and 
basic statistics are described. The statistical model and hypotheses are set up in section 
4. In section 5, the empirical estimations are shown, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Previous studies and theoretical discussion 
 
2.1 Previous studies 
Most previous studies analyzing patents use data from one or several national patent 
offices. This means that the researchers do not know whether the patents have been 
commercialized or not. Patent databases with detailed information (which are not 
available from the national patent offices) have seldom been collected earlier. The few 
previous studies with such databases have focused on estimating the profits from 
patenting rather than analyzing problems related to the commercialization (Rossman   3
and Sanders, 1957; Sanders et al., 1958; Sanders, 1962, 1964; Schmookler, 1966; 
Cutler, 1984; SRI International, 1985). 
Other studies of commercialization of inventions have mostly used technology 
offices in connection to universities, government laboratories (Jaffe and Lerner, 2001) 
or the firm (Utterback and Reitberger, 1982, Olofsson and Wahlbin, 1993; Rickne and 
Jacobsson, 1996, 1999; Lindholm-Dahlstrand, 1997a, 1997b; Cohen et al., 2000) as the 
unit of observation and then specifically start-up firms, although a majority of the 
patents and inventions probably are commercialized in existing firms. In the US, for 
example, 90% of the patents are commercialized in already existing firms (AUTM, 
1998). Furthermore, the interesting question is not whether inventions and patents lead 
to new firms, but whether they translate into a higher standard of living. 
Morgan et al. (2001) describe the commercialization rate of American patents 
across different groups. Industrial patents had a commercialization rate of 48.9%, 
whereas inventors in the education sector had a rate of 33.5%. However, the authors 
never try to relate this commercialization rate to other explanatory factors and do not 
run any survival model – perhaps due to lack of data. 
 
2.2 Theoretical discussion 
Patents, like R&D-projects, are typically characterized by high costs and no incomes in 
the early R&D-phase, and high uncertainty about future incomes. Apart from 
technological problems, lack of financial resources is one of the largest problems during 
the R&D-phase. In the later commercialization phase, several complementary resources 
are needed, e.g., financing, marketing and manufacturing capabilities. Large firms have 
these complementary capabilities as well as information about the market. Small firms 
have these resources in-house to a lower degree and individuals have none of these 
capabilities. Thus, large and small firms as well as indivduals have completely different 
conditions under which they commercialize their inventions. It is therefore likely that 
external financing and advices are needed by individuals and to some degree also by 
small firms. 
Clearly, the inventors have more knowledge about the invention / patent than 
potential external financiers. Thus, problems with asymmetrical information and 
adverse selection are present. The search and transaction costs to find interesting 
projects and to evaluate the technical and commercial potential are in other words large 
for external financiers. It is especially difficult to make this evaluation in the R&D-  4
phase, when the uncertainty about the project is very high. The Swedish government has 
during long time intervened on the market for external financing, because it has been 
claimed that there are market imperfections. However, this does not need to be true, 
because private PVC-firms exist private market solutions work well in other countries, 
e.g., in the U.S. 
Among the Swedish government institutions, SIC and NUTEK almost purely 
assist with financial resources during the R&D-phase, whereas ALMI enters when it is 
time for commercialization.
2 An inventor can during the R&D-phase apply for grants 
from SIC. These grants can be used to cover patent costs, which sometimes are very 
high. The application costs for a Swedish patent are around 3-5,000 Euro, but for a 
patent covering Europe they are around 25-50,000 Euro. A further step for SIC is to 
lend capital to the inventors. A typical SIC-loan is designed in the following way. The 
borrower pays a subsidized interest rate and begins to pay back the loan some years 
after the commercialization has started, but if there is no commercialization, then there 
is a possibility that the borrower does not need to pay pack the loan at all. NUTEK 
lends money to a subsidized interest rate primarily to firms during the R&D-phase 
(although grants are also possible). Similarly to SIC, these loans can wholly or partly be 
written off after some years, if the commercialization fails or turns out to be less 
successful than expected.
3 
Even more interesting is what happens if the borrower does receive incomes 
during the commercialization. The repayment of the loan is then connected to the 
turnover. This means that projects, which have a low or medium expected profit-level, 
will probably not be commercialized at all, since the repayment of the loan would then 
erase the whole profit. However, this will not stop the commercialization if the expected 
profit-level is high. Due to the design of the loans assisted by the government 
institutions, it is likely that there exist problems related to moral hazard. The inventors, 
who have received loans from the government, do not need to care about further 
commercialization of the patent, since they know that there is a high probability that 
they do not need to pay back the loans at all. If the expected profit of the project is of 
mediocre size, the incentives to continue the commercialization are low, since the 
                                                 
2 In contrast to ALMI, SIC has no local offices in Sweden. Therefore, ALMI evaluates many local patent 
projects and decide whether loans from SIC will be approved. SIC was winded up in 2003, but similar 
loans are since 2003 offered by ALMI. 
3 In 2004, 60% of the SIC-loans had been lent to projects that had failed. In the case of NUTEK, 50% of 
the borrowers pay back at least parts of the loans, whereas 1/3 of the lent money is paid back.   5
repayment is connected to the turnover rather than the profit. It is often better to exit the 
project, escape from paying back the loans and start a new project. 
Private venture capital (PVC) firms and private persons (business angels), who 
assist with financing during the R&D-phase, own shares in the patent project / firm. The 
repayment is then connected to the profit when the patent is commercialized. In contrast 
to the projects financed by the government, this means that even if the expected profit is 
of mediocre size, the inventors have incentives to undertake a commercialization. 
Furthermore, the government financing institutions do not maximize the profit. 
Their employed administrators have therefore few incentives to search for really good 
patent projects to lend money to. On the other hand, PVC-firms and business angels are 
profit maximizing. It is therefore more likely that they are more careful than 
government institutions in which patent projects they invest and that they have a more 
active, and advisory, role already during the R&D-phase. The PVC-firms not only 
provide financial capital, but also networks and competence in terms of knowledge 
about the market, marketing, juridical assistance, etc. An inventor or firm, which has 
received contacts and financing during the R&D-phase from a PVC-firm or business 
angel, should easier receive financing and advice during the commercialization phase. 
 
3. Database and descriptive statistics 
In order to analyze commercialization of patents, it is necessary to have a detailed 
database about individual patents.
4 In a previous pilot study (Svensson, 2002), most 
patents were commercialized within 5 years after they had been applied. Therefore, the 
year of 1998 is chosen for the current database. In 1998, 2760 patents were granted in 
Sweden. Of these, 776 were granted to foreign firms, 902 to large Swedish firms with 
more than 1000 employees, and 1082 to Swedish individuals and firms with less than 
1000 employees. Information about inventors, applying firms and their addresses for 
each patent was bought from the Swedish Patent and Registration Office (PRV). 
Thereafter, a questionnaire was sent out to the inventors of the patents.
5 In the pilot 
                                                 
4 All inventions do not result in patents. However, as an invention, which does not result in a patent, is not 
registered anywhere, there are two problems to empirically analyze the invention rather than the patent. 
Firstly, it is impossible to find these new ideas, products and developments among all firms and 
individuals. On the other hand, all patents are registered. Secondly, even if one finds the “inventions”, it 
is difficult to judge whether they are enough improvements to be called inventions or not. Only the 
national and international patent offices make such judgements. Therefore, the choice of the patent rather 
than the invention is the only alternative for an empirical study of the commercialization process. 
5 Each patent has always at least one inventor and often also an applying firm. The inventors or the 
applying firm can be the owner of the patent, but the inventors can also be owners of the patent indirectly,   6
survey carried out in 2002, it turned out that large Swedish firms refused to give 
information about individual patents. Furthermore, it is impossible to persuade foreign 
firms to fill in questionnaires about patents. These firms are almost always large 
multinationals firms. Therefore, the population consists of 1082 patents granted to 
Swedish individuals and firms with less than 1000 employees. 
In the questionnaire, we asked the inventors about the work place where the 
invention was created and the financing of the invention during the R&D phase, 
whether the invention had been commercialized, which kind of commercialization mode 
was chosen, how the commercialization was financed, about the inventors’ incomes and 
profits from the patent, and if there were any problems with the commercialization – 
alternatively why the patent never was commercialized. As many as 867 of the 
inventors filled in and returned the questionnaire, i.e., the response rate was 80% (867 
of 1082). This response rate is satisfactorily high, if one takes into account that such a 
database has seldom been collected before and that the inventors or the applying firms 
usually consider information about inventions and patents secret. 
The application year of the 867 patents is described as light-gray staples in 
Figure 1. 85% of the patents were applied between 1994-97. In 2003, 537 of these 
patents (61%) had started commercialization. The starting year of the commercialization 
are represented by dark staples, which almost follow a normal distribution. Although 
the last year of observation is 2003, it is not likely that many of the 330 non-
commercialized patents will be commercialized after 2003. 
  The 867 patents and the commercialization rate are described across firm groups 
and ownership in Table 1. As many as 408 patents (47 %) were granted to individual 
inventors, and 116, 201, 142 patents were granted to medium-sized firms (101-1000 
employees), small firms (11-100 employees) and close companies (2-10 employees). 
The commercialization rate of the firm groups is between 66 and 74%, whereas the rate 
of the individuals is not higher than 52%. A contingent-table test suggests that there is a 
significant difference in the commercialization rate between firms and individuals. The 
chi-square value is 30.55 (with 3 d.f.), significant at the 1 percent level. In the lower 
part of Table 1, it is shown that the commercialization rate is lower if the inventors are 
owner of the patent. The chi-square value is 4.43 (with 1 d.f.), significant at the 5%-
                                                                                                                                               
via the applying firm. Sometimes the inventors are only employed in the applying firm, which owns the 
patent. If the patent had more than one inventor, then the questionnaire was sent only to one inventor.   7
level. However, the ownership is closely related to the firm size, the larger the firm size, 
the lower share of the patents is (directly or indirectly) owned by the inventors. 
 
[Table 1] 
  In Table 2, the commercialization rate is related to external financing during the 
R&D phase. Patents with external financing during the R&D-phase have a significantly 
lower commercialization rate than those that have not. When dividing the external 
financing on different sources, the commercialization rate is significantly lower only for 
patents supported by government funds.
6 However, it is neither shown when the 
commercialization started nor how large share of the R&D that was financed with 





4. Statistical model and hypotheses 
 
4.1 Statistical model 
Since the analysis focuses on an “event” to occur, survival (duration) analysis is used in 
the statistical estimations. The event is here that the patent has been commercialized, 
and it is also measured when this commercialization started. Preliminary in the 
empirical analysis, a survival distribution function and a Hazard function will be 
estimated and plotted. The survival function, S(t) in equation 1, shows how large share 
of the patents that survive beyond a time point t. The Hazard function, h(t) in equation 
2, shows the conditional probability that a patent will be commercialized in a specific 
time period ∆t, given that it has “survived” (not been commercialized) until the 
beginning of t. The Hazard can also be expressed as a function of the probability density 
function, f(t), and the survival function. 
                                                 
6 In the group with other external financing, the financing might be government or private, but the 
intention with the financing is not to finance a patent application / project, but rather research in general. 
Here, the inventors often use the resources to the patent without the financers’ (mostly a university) 
knowledge about this. Therefore, this kind of financing is regarded as passive. In contrast, the government 
and private groups represent active financing, where the financier support, or invest in, a specific patent.   8
 
In the main empirical analysis, it is estimated how different explanatory factors 
affect the survival time of the patents. The dependent variable, Ti, is a random variable 
showing how many years it takes until commercialization started for patent i, measured 
from the time point of patent application. Most patents in the database were applied 
between 1994-97 and the end point of observation in the dataset is 2003. Patents that 
have not yet been commercialized in 2003 are “right-censored” (337 observations). If 
the owners have started the commercialization before they applied for the patent, then 
the patents are “left-censored” (37 observations). The measurement of the starting point 
of commercialization in years is a rather rough measure. Therefore, T is “interval-
censored” for those patents, which were commercialized after the patent application 
occurred and not later than 2003, i.e. the rest of the patents (493 observations). If the 
patent is commercialized within the first year, T gets an interval-censored value between 
0.1 and 1, within the second year T is between 1.1 and 2, etc. 
Since both left-censored and interval-censored observations are included, the 
most popular survival model, the Cox (1972) survival model, cannot be used.
7 Instead 
the accelerated failure time (AFT) model is the appropriate statistical model (Allison, 
1995): 
 
where ε is a random disturbance term, the β’s and σ are parameters to be estimated, and 
the x’s are explanatory variables. The ε‘s can have various distributions, corresponding 
to different AFT-models, e.g., the log-normal, log-logistic, exponential, Weibull and 
gamma models. In the empirical part, all of these models will be run. By using 
likelihood-ratio tests, it is possible to decide which of the models that fits the data best. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The fact that there are left- and interval-censored observations is also the reason why a usual logit 
survival model cannot be used. 
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4.2 Hypotheses 
Turning to the explanatory variables, such factors are included that are expected to 
affect: 1) the time it takes to commercialize the patent (survival time); or 2) the 
probability that patent will be commercialized at all. Basic statistics and hypotheses of 
these factors are described in Table 3, and correlations are shown in Appendix Table 
A1. When interpreting the sign of the hypotheses in Table 3, it is important to remember 
the definition of equation (3). A positive parameter estimate means that the survival 
time increases (or in other words that the conditional probability of commercialization 
decreases) when the explanatory variable gets a higher value. 
Other factors that are specific for the commercialization, e.g., commercialization 
mode (licensing, new company, selling the patent, etc.), financing during the 
commercialization or whether the inventors are active or passive during the 
commercialization, are not included in the estimations, since they cannot be measured 
for non-commercialized patents. 
  It is expected that firms, which have marketing, manufacturing and financial 
resources in-house, have better possibilities to commercialize their patents compared to 
individuals. FIRM1 is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 for medium-sized firms 
with 101-1000 employees, and 0 otherwise. FIRM2 equals 1 for small firms with 11-
100 employees, and 0 otherwise. Finally, FIRM3 is a third dummy taking the value of 1 
for close companies with 2-10 employees, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the firm dummies are 
here related to the reference group of individual inventors. Therefore, the parameter 
estimates are expected to be negative, implying a shorter “survival” time of the patents 
and a higher probability that the patents will be commercialized. Which of the three 
dummies that has the highest value is difficult to predict. It is true that large firms have 
more resources available for a commercialization, but it is not clear that larger firms are 
more likely to commercialize patents than smaller firms. Previous studies have, for 
example, shown that large multinational firms tend to patent more inventions (“shadow 
patents”) in order to protect other patents (Cohen et al., 2000). 
As discussed above, the Swedish government institutes, which assist with 
financing of patent projects, have a curious design of their loans. The borrower can 
escape from paying back the loan if the patent is not commercialized. If the patent is 
commercialized, repayment is connected to the turnover rather than the profit. This 
means that the expected profit of a commercialization must be higher than a threshold 
value – otherwise the repayment will erase the profit. It is therefore likely that the   10
government financing during the R&D phase will create moral hazard problems. The 
loan conditions will attract inventors, who own inventions with no perspectives of 
commercialization, and will deter many good patents from being commercialized, 
because the expected profit level is not high enough. GOVFIN measures how large 
share of the patent’s R&D-costs (in percent) that was financed through government 
capital.
8 A positive influence on the survival time is expected. 
In a similar way, the variable PRIVFIN shows how many percent of the R&D 
costs that were financed through external private venture capital. Private venture 
capitalist can be regarded as strict profit maximizing and they only invest in projects 
they believe in. The external financiers should therefore push harder for that the patents 
will be commercialized and create incomes. It is also likely that patents that had 
external private financing during the R&D phase, have more easy to attract external 
venture capital (from the same private venture capitalists) during the commercialization 
phase. Therefore, a negative effect of PRIVFIN on the survival time is expected. 
There is also a third kind of external financing. OTHERFIN measures how large 
share of the R&D costs, which was financed through universities and research 
foundations. Typically, patents created at universities have this kind of external 
financing. The intention of this financing is not to assist a patent project, but rather to 
finance R&D in general. The financiers have, however, no control of what the resources 
actually are used for. It is difficult for the inventors to use the resources for patent 
applications, but more easy to hide labor costs necessary for creating the invention 
within this financing. A problem with this kind of financing is that it cannot be used for 
commercialization. Consequently, the inventors stand often alone without financing 
when considering commercialization. A positive parameter estimate is therefore 
expected. 
Basic research is relatively more common at universities. It is then likely that 
university patents also are more related to basic research and have a lower probability of 
commercialization (Jaffe and Lerner, 2001). In contrast to the U.S., the university 
researchers in Sweden are wholly owners of their patents. The Swedish universities 
have no ownership and consequently no interest in that employed researchers 
commercialize their patents. The dummy UNIV, which equals 1 for university patents, is 
therefore expected to have a positive influence on the survival time. 
                                                 
8 Patent application costs are included in the R&D costs.   11
OWNER shows how large share (in percent) of the patent that the inventors own 
directly or indirectly. If the inventors, who have the technological knowledge of the 
patent, also are owners of the patent, they should have larger incentive to work harder 
for a commercialization. A negative parameter estimate on the survival time is therefore 
expected. 
MOREPAT is an additive dummy, which equals 1 if the inventors or the 
applying firm have more competitive patents in the same technology area and 0 
otherwise. To apply for many similar patents is a strategy often chosen by owners – 
especially large firms – who want to protect a main patent. These extra patents are 
called shadow patents and are seldom commercialized. However, many patents can also 
be an indication of that the owners have more knowledge and experience of the area, 
and should therefore increase the probability of commercialization. Therefore, the 
impact on the survival time is unsettled. Finally, INVNMBR is here the number of 
inventors of the patent. 
It is likely that different technologies are connected with different risks. 
Consequently, the technology class can affect the survival time and conditional 
probability that a patent will be commercialized. The patents are divided in 30 
technology groups according to Breschi et al. (2004). These groups are based on the 
patents’ main IPC-Class. However, all technology groups are not represented in the 
dataset and some groups have too few observations. Therefore, only 26 groups and 25 
additive dummies are used in the present study.
9 
The data is divided into six different kinds of regions according to NUTEK 
(1998): Large-city regions, university regions, regions with important primary city 
centers, regions with secondary city centers, small regions with private employment, 
and small regions with government employment. Five additive dummies are included in 
the estimations for these six groups. 
Additive dummies are also included for different application years, since the 
level on the business cycle may affect when and whether a patent will be 
commercialized. The data has five application year periods (1985-90, 1991-92, 1993-94, 
1995-96, 1997-98) and four additive dummies are assigned for these periods.
10 
                                                 
9 The technology classes with too few observations are instead merged together with other classes, which 
are closely related (Breschi et al., 2004). 
10 Preliminary, time dummies for individual application years were used.  But one of the models (the 
gamma model) did not converge by some reason. Therefore, time dummies for two-year periods are used 
instead. The usage of two-year periods does not alter the results for the other estimated parameters. Note,   12
5. Empirical estimations 
In Figure 2, the survival and hazard functions for the sample are estimated by the Life-
table method (actuarial method). The patent application year is set to 0. The survival 
function falls steeply in the beginning, but after 4-5 years it levels away. The fact that 
the survival function equals around 0.95 at year 0 depends on that almost 5% of the 
inventions are commercialized before the owners have applied a patent for them. The 
Hazard function (conditional probability) is the highest during the first three years after 
the application. In Figure 3, the same survival and hazard functions are estimated, but 
this time the sample is divided in two groups: one with government financing and the 
other without. The survival function suggests that the gap increases over time and the 
hazard is mostly higher for patents with no government financing. The survival 
functions for patents with and without private venture capital are similar (not shown), 
and with respect to other external financing, the survival function is lower (higher 
commercialization rate) for those patents with no other external financing (not shown). 
The AFT-model is run using three different variants in order to test for 
robustness: Model I with region dummies, Model 2 with technology dummies and 
Model III with both technology and region dummies. Furthermore, there are five 
different models based on the residual distributions: the exponential, Weibull, log-
logistic, log-normal and gamma models. Before turning to the estimated parameters of 
the explanatory variables, I firstly analyze goodness-of-fit of the models. 
In Table 4, goodness-of-fit tests based on the log-likelihoods for the models are 
presented. The gamma model, which is the most general model, has the highest log-
likelihood. The other models are tested against this model. As can be seen, both the 
exponential and Weibull models are rejected. The log-normal model seems to fit the 
data as good as the gamma model. The log-logistic model has a very low log-likelihood, 
but this model is not nested with the other ones. No test can therefore be applied. 
Another way to analyze goodness-of-fit is to look at the hazard function, which 
is closely connected to the residual characteristics of the different models. In Figure 2, 
the hazard function has an inverted U-shape, which is typical for a log-normal model. 
Also a log-logistic model can have a hazard with an inverted U-shape, provided that the 
scale parameter is estimated to lower than 1. In the estimation of the log-logistic model, 
however, the scale parameter equals 3.4. Based on the log-likelihood and the value of 
                                                                                                                                               
only one patent was applied in 1985 and no during the 1986-89 period. Therefore, 1985 and 1990 have 
been merged into one group.   13
the estimated scale parameter, the log-logistic model is therefore rejected. The 
exponential model corresponds to a constant hazard function and the Weibull model to a 
monotonously declining or increasing hazard. Thus, it is not surprising that these 
models are rejected. 
  The estimations of the AFT-model are shown in Table 5. The values and the 
significance levels of the estimated parameters are very similar across the log-normal 
and gamma models for all explanatory variables. The results are also robust across 
Models I-III, where different dummy variables for regions and technologies are 
included. As expected, the estimated time it takes until commercialization starts is 
significantly shorter for the three firm size groups (FIRM1-FIRM3) compared to 
individuals. Thus, patents owned by firms have a shorter time until commercialization 
starts compared to patents owned by individuals, indicating that firms have more 
complementary financial, manufacturing and marketing capabilities. However, the 
difference between the three firm-groups is not significant. The quantitative 
interpretation of the estimated parameters in the log-normal model III is that if the firm 
dummies take on the value 1 instead of 0, then the survival time decreases with 59.6, 
50.9 and 61.7% for FIRM1, FIRM2 and FIRM3 compared to individuals, respectively.
11 
  Turning to the financial variables, GOVFIN has a positive and strongly 
significant influence on the survival time. The quantitative interpretation of the 
estimated parameter in the log-normal model III is as follows: if the government 
financing during the R&D-phase increases by 1 unit (in this case 1%-unit), then the 
survival time increases by 1.51%. A more accurate interpretation is, however, that the 
government’s loan condition creates a selection bias of patents with no or bad 
perspectives of commercialization. It is likely that many of the inventions behind the 
patents would never be patented without the government assistance. The loan conditions 
also deter many good patents from being commercialized, since the repayment, which is 
connected to the turnover, erases the profit. If one regards that this selection bias would 
“disturb” the estimated effects of the other explanatory variables in the regressions, then 
it is lucky that the variable, which creates the disturbance, GOVFIN, actually is included 
in the estimations. It is likely that GOVFIN will take account of the pool of bad patents. 
                                                 
11 The quantitative interpretation of the effect of the explanatory variables (also dummies) on the survival 
time is done in the following way. If the explanatory variable increases with 1 unit, the survival time 
changes with 100(e
β-1)%.   14
The estimated parameter of PRIVFIN has the expected negative sign, but is only 
significant at the 10%-level in two of six runs. OTHFIN never turns out to have any 
significant effect. UNIV has the expected positive influence, but is surprisingly only 
significant at the 10%-level in four of six runs. The university researchers have a 
commercialization rate of only 34% compared to 61% in the whole dataset. A problem 
is here that the typical inventor (but not all of them) who receives external financing 
from universities and research foundations (i.e. OTHFIN has a positive value) is a 
university researcher. Thus, OTHFIN and UNIV partly measure the same thing. The 
correlation between the two variables is 0.52 (see Appendix Table A1), not extremely 
strong, but maybe strong enough to disturb the estimations. In the first and second 
column of Table 6, one of the two variables is alternatively excluded for the log-normal 
model III. UNIV is then significant at the 5%-level and OTHFIN at the 10%-level. 
However, the results for the other variables are not affected. The same result with 
respect to significance levels for UNIV and OTHERFIN are obtained also if Model I or 
II is chosen, or if the Gamma model is run instead. Thus, I conclude that university 
patents have a significantly longer time until commercialization starts. The quantitative 
interpretation of an increase from 0 to 1 for the dummy UNIV is that the time it takes 
until commercialization starts increases with as much as 246%. 
  More robustness tests of the log-normal model are shown in Table 6. INVNMBR 
is dropped in the third and fourth columns of Table 6 and MOREPAT in the fourth 
column. The results of the other variables are not affected. In the fifth column of Table 
6, a group of five patent strategy dummies are included compared to the main 
estimation in Table 5.
12 These dummies show in which international regions the owners 
have applied for a patent. The group of dummies is highly significant. A problem with 
these dummy variables is, however, that they are likely to be endogenous. The choice to 
apply for patents in other countries almost always occurs after the patent application in 
the home country and is likely to be dependent on if the owners have decided to 
commercialize the patent or not. Therefore, not much attention is given to the 
estimations in the fifth column.
13 
                                                 
12 The international patent application strategies of the owners are divided into six groups: 1) World 
patent (PCT); 2) OECD-countries; 3) Europe (EPO); 4) USA/North America; 5) Some separate countries 
in Europe; and 6) No patent applications in other countries. Additive dummies are assigned to groups 1-5. 
13 The Weibull, exponential and logistic models were all rejected based on the likelihood-ratios tests, but 
GOVFIN and the firm-size dummies (FIRM1-FIRM3) have the same strong influence on the dependent 
variables also in these models. Furthermore, especially in the Weibull and Exponential models, PRIVFIN   15
6. Concluding remarks 
In the present study, a survival model was run, for the first time, to estimate how 
different explanatory factors affect the time it takes until patents are commercialized. A 
unique database on Swedish patents was used, where it is possible to observe if and 
when the patents were commercialized. It was especially analyzed how the financing of 
the R&D-phase influence the probability that the patents are commercialized. This is 
interesting, since compared to the U.S., where the external financing occurs on a private 
market, Sweden has during long time relied on government support. 
  The most interesting conclusion from the estimations is that the larger share of 
the costs during the R&D-phase that are covered by financial support by government 
institutions, the longer time it takes until the commercialization starts. A more accurate 
interpretation is that the government financing creates a pool of patents, which have few 
perspectives of commercialization. Many of the owners of these inventions would never 
apply for a patent at all, had it not been for the government support. It is likely that the 
bad performance of patents financed by the government depends on moral hazard 
problems, due to the design of the government loans. The borrower can escape from 
paying back the loan if the project failures. If commercialization is undertaken, 
repayment is connected to the turnover. This means that patents, which have a low or 
medium expected profit, will seldom be commercialized. Private venture capital firms, 
on the other hand, are repaid as a share of the profits. Thus, there is always an incentive 
to commercialize for the owners even if the profit is low. Another explanation to the bad 
performance of the government patent projects could be that the government institutions 
are not profit maximizing, and consequently have no incentives to find promising patent 
projects to lend money to. 
Patents with private external financing during the R&D-phase are commer-
cialized at least as fast as the average, but not significantly faster. On the other hand, 
university patents have a significantly longer time until they are commercialized. 
Different sizes of firms had a strongly significant impact on the commercialization start 
time. Patents created in firms (medium-sized and small firms as well as close 
companies) are commercialized faster than patents owned by individuals, indicating 
                                                                                                                                               
has a negative and significant parameter estimate, and UNIV a positive and significant parameter 
estimate, both mostly at the 5%-level. 
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how important complementary resources, like financing, marketing and manufacturing, 
are for commercialization. 
Considering policy implications, the government should change the design of 
the loans. For example, the repayment should be connected to the profit of the 
commercialization instead of connected to the turnover. The best recommendation is, 
however, that the government stops to act as a venture capital firm, and does not lend 
any money at all. One argument for the government to intervene in the market for 
venture capital would be that there are market imperfections in the market for external 
financing. However, this does not need to be true, since private PVC-firms exist and 
private market solutions work well in other countries, e.g., in the U.S. 
The Swedish government should instead facilitate market solutions and the 
growth of PVC-firms. According to Braunerhjelm (1999), the lack of private venture 
capital in Sweden depends on the tax system. Changes are especially urgent with 
respect to taxation of PVC-firms. Today, the Swedish PVC-firms are tripled taxed. 
First, the profits / dividends from the projects are taxed, second, there is a tax on the 
profit in the PVC-firm and, finally, the dividends from the PVC-firms to the owners are 
taxed. In close companies, the taxation rules should also be changed. A large part of the 
profits for active shareholders is today taxed as working incomes (>50% marginal tax 
rate) instead of as capital incomes (constant 30% marginal tax rate). A shift of the 
taxation towards capital incomes would mean that business angels easier and earlier 
could invest in different projects. Another advantage with private PVC-firms is that they 
not only supply financial resources, but also networks and competence in the form of 
marketing and management. 
Finally, I give some suggestions for future research. In the present study, I have 
analyzed how different factors affect the choice to commercialize patents or not. There 
are further steps to investigate, for example, how different factors influence the 
performance of the commercialization. Some kind of patent projects has maybe a higher 
expected level of profit than others, depending on the characteristics (e.g., financing, 
risk, technology) of the projects. The probability of success and the expected profit 
given that the project is successful are other success dimensions to investigate and relate 
the explanatory factors with. 
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Table 1. Commercialization of patents across firm sizes and inventors’ ownership, 
number of patents and percent. 
Number of patents 
 Commercialization   
 






Medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees)    77    39  116  66 % 
Small firms (11-100 employees)  137    64  201  68 % 
Close companies (2-10 employees)  105    37  142  74 % 
Inventors alone (1-4 inventors)  211  197  408  52 % 
Total  530 337  867  61  % 
Inventors’ ownership (directly or indirectly)         
Owner  366   255  621  59 % 
Not owner  164    82  246  67 % 
Total  530 337  867  61  % 
 
 
Table 2. External financing during the R&D-phase and commercialization, 
number of patents and percent. 
Any external financing 
Commercialization  External financing 
during the R&D-phase  Yes No 
Total Percent 
No 422  238  660  63.6  % 
Yes  108    99  207  52.2 % 
Total 530  337  867  61.1  % 
Chi-square-test = 9.18 ** 
 
Government external financing 
Commercialization  External financing 





  70 
265 





Total 530  337  867  61.1  % 
Chi-square = 10.01 *** 
 
Private external financing 
Commercialization  External financing 





  30 
319 
  18 
819 
  48 
61.1 % 
62.5 % 
Total 530  337  867  61.1  % 
Chi-square = 0.04 
 
Other external financing (e.g., universities, research foundations) 
Commercialization  External financing 





  41 
305 
  32 
794 
  73 
61.6 % 
56.2 % 
Total 530  337  867  61.1  % 
Chi-square = 0.83 
Note: 207 patents have external financing, but some patents have external financing from more than one 
source. (“patfin1.sas”)   20
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and hypotheses for the explanatory variables. 









Dummy taking the value of 1 for medium-sized 
firms (101-1000 employees), and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy taking the value of 1 for small firms (11-100 
employees), and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy taking the value of 1 for close companies (2-



















Percent of R&D financed by government. 
Percent of R&D financed by private venture capital. 


















Dummy that equals 1 if the patent was created at a 
university, and 0 otherwise. 
Percent of the patent that is directly or indirectly 
owned by the inventors. 
Dummy taking the value of 1 if the inventors have 
more similar (competitive) patents. 





























Table 4. Goodness-of-fit tests with Likelihood-ratio statistic. 
Model Log-likelihood 
 







   -1659.37 
   -1580.84 
   -1925.08 
   -1567.44 
   -1567.35 
Exponential vs. Weibull 
Exponential vs. Gamma 
Weibull vs. Gamma 







  26.98 *** 
                    0.18 
Note: The log-likelihoods are taken from Model III. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. The same conclusion with respect to significance of the tests would be done, if 
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Table 5. Empirical estimations of the AFT-model. 
Dependent variable  log (T) 
Statistical model  Accelerated failure time (AFT) model 
Log-normal model  Gamma model  Explanatory 
variables  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model I  Model II  Model III 
FIRM1 
  (dummy) 
 
FIRM2 
  (dummy) 
 
FIRM3 




































































































































































































Region dummies  
(5 d.f.) 
7.20  -----     7.94  7.03  -----    7.69 
Technology 
dummies (25 d.f.) 
----- 19.54  20.25 ----- 19.40  20.01 
Time dummies  
(5 d.f.) 
1.65    1.63    1.43  1.54    1.49    1.22 















  2.13 
 
 -0.16 
  2.11 
 
 -0.10 
Log-likelihood -1577.59  -1571.40  -1567.44 -1577.58 -1571.18 -1567.35 
Likelihood-ratio test  75.38***  87.76***  95.68*** 71.50*** 84.30*** 91.96*** 
Note: The total number of observations equals 867, of which 37 are left-censored observations, 493 
interval-censored, and 337 right-censored. Standard errors are in parentheses and ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. For the region, technology and time dummies, only 
Wald chi-square values (never significant) for the whole group of dummies are shown. Intercepts as well 
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Table 6. Robustness tests of the AFT-model, log-normal model. 
Dependent variable  log (T) 
Statistical model  Accelerated failure time (AFT) model 
Log-normal model  Explanatory 
variables  Model III  Model III  Model III  Model III  Model III 
FIRM1 
  (dummy) 
 
FIRM2 
  (dummy) 
 
FIRM3 






































































































































































dummies (5 d.f.) 
----- -----  -----  -----  34.43  *** 
Region dummies  
(5 d.f.) 
 7.86     8.24  8.07  7.44  6.38 
   
Technology 
dummies (25 d.f.) 
19.97 19.48  20.04  20.16  25.94 
Time dummies  
(5 d.f.) 
1.33    1.57  1.45  1.56    0.90 
  
Scale parameter, σ  2.08  2.08  2.08  2.08    2.04 
Log-likelihood -1567.73  -1569.13 -1567.93 -1569.02  -1549.97 
Likelihood-ratio test  95.10***  92.30***  94.70***  92.52***  130.62*** 
Note: The total number of observations equals 867, of which 37 are left-censored observations, 493 
interval-censored, and 337 right-censored. Standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. For the region, technology and time dummies, only 
Wald chi-square values (never significant) for the whole group of dummies are shown. Intercepts as well 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Pearson correlation matrix for the explanatory variables. 
FIRM2  -0.22
***              
FIRM3  -0.17
*** -0.24
***            
GOVFIN  -0.10
*** -0.19




*          
OTHFIN   0.02  -0.04  -0.08
** -0.05    0.10




**   0.03   0.20
***   0.53
***      
OWNER  -0.54
*** -0.35
***   0.02   0.20
*** -0.05  -0.03    0.03     
MOREPAT   0.12
***   0.12
***   0.05   0.13
***   0.10
*** -0.01  -0.04 -0.19
***  
INVNMBR   0.08
**   0.02  -0.04   0.04   0.14   0.25
***   0.14
*** -0.07
**   0.09
*** 
  FIRM1 FIRM2 FIRM3  GOVFIN  PRIVFIN OTHFIN UNIV  OWNER MORE
PAT 
Note: The number of observations equals 867. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Survival distribution and hazard functions for Swedish patents.